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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PoLIcE OFFICERS EXECUTING SEARCH
WARRANTS MUST ANNOUNCE THEIR AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE
AND BE REFUSED ADMITTANCE BEFORE EVEN A TECHNICAL
BREAKING Is ALLOWED. Sears v. State, 528 P.2d 732 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974).
In Oklahoma entries by officers for the purpose of executing
search warrants are restricted by the provisions of section 1228 of title
22 of the Oklahoma statutes.1 This statute reflects the common law
requirement of announcement of identity and purpose and request for
admission before breaking into a house to execute a search warrant.2
The requirement of announcement is a specific limitation on the execu-
tion of warrants, in addition to the requirement that all searches must
be executed in a reasonable manner.3
It is interesting to note, in view of all the attention focused on no-
knock searches and unannounced entries by officers during the past
few years, that prior to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' re-
cent decision in Sears v. State4 the Oklahoma courts had not had oc-
casion to focus directly on the extent of the announcement require-
ments imposed by the statute. Also, considering some of the un-
answered questions raised by the broad language used in Sears, it
seems probable that the court will soon find it necessary to delineate
the limits of those requirements. For this reason the facts and holding
in Sears are worthy of some attention.
The only issue considered in Sears was whether -the entry by the
officers into the defendant's apartment was in conformance with the
provisions of section 1228. The court found that the entry by officers
prior to announcing their identity and purpose and requesting admit-
tance did not comply with the statute, that the search was therefore
illegal, and that defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
by the search should have been sustained.5
1. "The officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of the house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of
his authority and purpose he be refused admittance." OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1228
(1971).
2. For an examination of the common law requirement of announcement, see
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). Also see Blakey, The Rule of Announce-
ment and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1964).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; OKLA. CONST. art. I1, § 30.
4. 528 P.2d 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
5. Id.
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The facts of the case as stated by the court indicated that two
officers went to the defendant's front door with a search warrant.
Through a large window they observed the defendant sitting at the
kitchen table. One of the officers knocked on the door. The door
latch was not in the groove and the pressure from the knock caused
the door to open. The officer testified that he may have had to push
the door open even further to enter. The officers walked in, identified
themselves to the defendant and served him with a copy of the warrant.
In the search which followed the officers found marijuana and other
evidence which was used at the trial. The defendant was convicted
of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
In reversing the conviction, the court relied heavily upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Sabbath v. United States.'
In fact, a large portion of the Sears opinion consists of a recitation of
the facts and quotations from Sabbath.
Sabbath involved an entry by officers to arrest without a warrant.
However, the United States Supreme Court held that the officers were
bound by the same criteria which are embodied in section 3109 of title
18 of the United States Code,7 the language of which is virtually identi-
cal to that of the Oklahoma statute. In Sabbath, narcotics agents had
knocked on the defendant's door, waited a few seconds, and when no
one responded, they opened the unlocked door and entered with their
guns drawn. The Supreme Court, considering whether the opening of
an unlocked door required prior notice of purpose and authority under
section 3109, stated:
Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-
American law, had declared in § 3109 the reverence of the
law for the individual's right of privacy in his house.8
Considering the purposes of § 3109, it would indeed be
a "grudging application" to hold, as the Government urges,
that the use of "force" is an indispensable element of the stat-
6. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
7. Section 3109 applies to entries for the purpose of executing a warrant and pro-
vides: "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate him-
self or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant." In Oklahoma, the restric-
tions on entries for an arrest without a warrant are contained in OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 194 and are practically identical to the restriction on execution of search warrants con-
tained in section 1228.
8. 391 U.S. at 589, quoting from Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313
(1958).
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ute. To be sure, the statute uses the phrase "break open"
and that connotes some use of force. But linguistic analysis
seldom is adequate when a statute is designed to incorporate
fundamental values and the ongoing development of the
common law.9
The above language from Sabbath was quoted in the Sears opinionY°
The Oklahoma court was quite emphatic in holding that the an-
nouncement restrictions contained in section 1228 are to be strictly ob-
served. The opinion does not, however, indicate the degree of em-
phasis placed by the court on the presence of a technical breaking in
determining that the entry of the officers in Sears fell within the mean-
ing of the statute. It is apparent that at the very least the restrictions
apply to entries which constitute a breaking in common law burglary,
such as "lifting a latch, turning a door knob, unhooking a chain or hasp,
removing a prop to, or pushing a closed door of entrance to the house-
even a closed screen door."" It is not clear whether the court intends
to apply the restrictions to entries into houses in the absence of even
a technical breaking.
Considering the importance the Oklahoma court placed on the
statutory restrictions as a protection of the individual's right of privacy
in his home, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the restrictions will
be applied to all entries into dwellings by police officers which would
amount to trespasses by private citizens. A similar interpretation of
the federal statute was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in dicta in Keiningham v. United
States:12
We think that a person's right to privacy in his home
(and the limitation of authority to a searching police officer)
is governed by something more than the fortuitous circum-
stance of an unlocked door, and that the word "break," as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 means "enter without permission."
We think that a "peaceful" entry which does not violate the
provisions of § 3109 must be a permissive one, and not
merely one which does not result in breaking parts of the
house.' 3
Another aspect of the Sears opinion which deserves attention is
the reference to exigent circumstances which would justify noncom-
9. 391 U.S. at 589.
10. 528 P.2d at 734.
11. 528 P.2d at 734, quoting from Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. at 590 n.5.
12. 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
13 Id. at 130. See also Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894, 896, 897 (D.C. Cir.
1961) in which the court adopted the same interpretation of the federal statute. -
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pliance with the statute. The court specifically referred to circum-
stances in which "the officers are aware that the occupants of a house
are armed and dangerous and strict compliance with the statute would
expose the officers to great peril, injury, or death."' 4
Several exceptions to the requirement of announcement existed
at common law and have been recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court as applying to any constitutional rules relating to an-
nouncement and entry.' 5 These exceptions are (1) where the officer's
authority and purpose is already known by the persons within, (2)
where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are in
imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where officers are justified in
believing that those within are engaged in an escape or the destruction
of evidence.' 6 The Sabbath opinion indicates that these exceptions
might also apply to the provisions of the federal statute. 17
Sears leaves open the question of whether all the exceptions will
be recognized in applying the Oklahoma statute. Nevertheless, the
court's opinion is helpful in anticipating the direction of future deci-
sions. For example, the case of Kelso v. State,'8 which was cited in
Sears as requiring strict compliance with the restrictions of section
1228, upheld a forcible entry by officers without prior announcement
of identity or purpose. The entry which was attacked could have fallen
within the common law exception where the occupants are aware of the
identity and purpose of the officers or where they are attempting to
destroy evidence; however, this was not discussed in Sears. Instead,
Kelso was distinguished from Sears by virtue of the fact that in Kelso
the "issue [of the validity of the search] was not preserved by timely
motion and the petitioner's allegations were not sustained by the evi-
dence." The court, in Sears, praised the Oklahoma legislature for re-
fusing to implement the "once popular, and now discredited, 'no-knock'
entrance procedure,"' 9 and, in referring to an exigent circumstance
which would justify an exception to the statute, they limited their exam-
ple to a situation in which compliance would result in exposure of offi-
cers to great peril, injury, or death.
It appears, from an analysis of the approach taken by the court
in the Sears opinion, that future interpretations of section 1228 will
14. 528 P.2d at 735.
15. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
16. Id. at 47 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
17. 391 U.S. at 591 n.8.
18. 260 P.2d 864 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953).
19. 528 P.2d at 735.
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